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LOSS PREVENTION IN NON-SCHEDULED
CIVIL AVIATION.*
JEROME LEDERERt
Aviation literature abounds with information about safety and
the prevention of accidents. A tremendous amount of thought and
activity is constantly devoted to the achievement of greater safety in
the design and operation of airplanes. Accident records and sta-
tistics are zealously studied to determine where improvements can
be made. But according to the former Bureau of Air Commerce
and presumably the present Civil Aeronautics Authority, "An air-
craft accident is an occurrence which takes place while an aircraft
is being operated as such, as a result of which a person or persons
are injured or killed or the aircraft receives appreciable or marked
damage as a result of a failure of the aircraft structure or engine or
through the forces of external contact, or through fire. For the
purpose of analysis, an aircraft is considered as 'being operated as
such' from the time the pilot or passengers board the aircraft with
the intention of flight until such time as the pilot and passengers
disembark from the aircraft upon completion of flight."
Without taking issue with the definition, everyone should recog-
nize the fact that many losses occur outside this conception. Al-
though these losses may not necessarily involve safety of passengers,
of the public or of personnel, they do seriously affect aviation
economics. For instance, when a hangar full of airplanes is de-
stroyed by fire, no one's safety is necessarily involved, an accident
as defined above has not occurred. But in one recent hangar fire,
aviation suffered a loss of aircraft valued at $300,000 or the equi-
valent of thirty dollars for each civil airplane in this country!
Insurance companies pay out an average of $2,000 per week for
airplanes lost by fire alone. Furthermore, when a radio is stolen
from an airplane, when a hangar collapses on airplanes stored in it,
when a windstorm picks up a parked airplafie and then hurls it
down to crash or when a spectator stumbles over a tail wheel dolly
and sprains his back, losses occur which may be far removed from
safety as that word is usually understood in aviation. These losses
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in the end are paid for by airplane owners. Aeronautical Engineers
therefore should be interested not only in the special study of safety
to passengers and crew but also in the general study of loss pre-
vention.
To cover completely the field of loss prevention would be im-
possible in a paper of this nature. These notes will be confined to
some of the outstanding loss prevention problems in non-scheduled
civil aviation such as windstorm, fire and particularly light airplane
losses because light airplanes are involved in over 30% of all acci-
dents while constituting about 22% of all civil airplanes. Further-
more, the light plane business is the fastest growing in aviation and
therefore deserves special consideration right now. Moreover, what
is true of the light airplane is also generally applicable to all air-
planes.
Loss prevention or safety can be achieved in three ways: (1)
By improvements in design, (2) by control or regulation or (3) by
education or experience.
Regulation and education are governed largely by the design
and characteristics of the airplane. For instance, if airplanes were
designed that would not stall or spin, Federal regulation of spin
testing or the education of student pilots in the danger of the stall/
spin, would not be necessary. Certain physical standards like depth
perception and the need for thorough education in landing technique
result from the landing characteristics peculiar to the present con-
ventional type of airplane. The need for regulation* and safety
education is therefore no compliment to the engineer. Regulation
and education should vary inversely with improvements in design.
Pending improvements in design, the prevention of losses by
wind and fire requires a minimum of regulation and a maximum-of
education. The number of airplanes lost by fire or windstorm last
year is unknown because such losses, being outside the official defini-
tion of accidents, were not reported in the Bureau of Air Commerce
analyses of accidents and no other agency is gathering the informa-
tion. Perhaps the new Civil Aeronautics Authority will expand its
activities to include all losses.
Light airplanes need not be caught in a storm to suffer damage
by wind. Low wing loadings make them very susceptible to damage
by winds of relatively small velocities. A light plane being operated
by a novice in a wind of about 20 miles per hour (known as a
moderate or fresh wind) or over is likely to be damaged seriously.
Taxiing these planes in fresh winds requires skill and experience.
Even winds less than 20 miles per hour are dangerous for light
planes but proper instruction in the difficult taxiing problems pre-
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sented by wind would eliminate most of the losses. Perhaps the
tricycle undercarriage or some other change would enable safer
operation latitude in operating them in strong winds. Until that
time arises the pilot of a light airplane should be instructed to adopt
the following suggestions:
1. Not to operate if wind conditions are very gusty or if wind
is near or greater than 20 miles per hour. The light plane is then
safest inside a hangar.
2. Check the wind forecasts before attempting any 'cross-
country trips.
3. If caught in bad wind, land airplane a little faster than
normal. Keep the tail up as long as possible.
4. Wait for help to roll the airplane to the hangar if taxiing is
difficult.
Heavier airplanes usually suffer only in much stronger winds
or in severe gusts and these losses often occur while the airplane is
parked in the open.
Although winds may affect heavy airplanes less than light ones,
fire has no favorites. Fire seems to occur in the strangest ways
and often under peculiar circumstances. One plane was partly
destroyed recently because the spark from a passing locomotive
settled on the wing, setting it on fire. Another one was lost by
an arc from an improperly installed' radio antenna. Not long ago
smoke was noticed coming from the bottom of a ship, with no one
near it. Fire was found just behind the seat and baggage com-
partment. A few minutes before, the pilot with a cigarette in his
mouth had reached in to get the log books. Evidently a spark had
dropped from the cigarette through a space between the back of
the seat and the door and had dropped down to the flammable fabric.
In another case the wiring to the electric flares was only partly
encased in a protective metal conduit. Wires from the radio ran
parallel and close to the flare wires, inducing a current in them
which set off the flares. This occurred while the radio was being
checked in the hangar.
The spark from a welding torch floated into the belly of a ship
being repaired and resulted in a complete loss. A mechanic was
removing a battery when it arced igniting gasoline fumes from a
leaking valve. One cold morning -a mechanic started a fire in a coal
stove with oil soaked gloves on his hands. One glove caught on fire,
then the other caught and fell into a pail of gasoline resulting in
the loss of five ships.
Static electricity either while refueling or spraying with dope
or gasoline has caused several serious fires. Unprotected electric
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light bulbs at the end of extension cords, when allowed to rest on
fabric, are also a frequent cause of loss.
Another airplane was destroyed when a pan of gasoline which
had formed under the dripping carburetor was ignited by a spark
from the exhaust of a tractor which was being driven out of the
hangar.
Fire in the air fortunately occurs less often than on the ground
but it too usually results in total loss. In one case the fuel line on
the left engine of a ship broke in flight. The pilot did not know
what had happened because the fire, being in the blast of the air-
stream within the cowl, was similar to a blow-torch flame, small but
hot and hardly visible. The engine kept running although fuel
pressure was falling and the pilot experienced other troubles. He
landed safely but as soon as the airplane lost speed, the air blast no
longer confined the blaze. It spread so rapidly that passengers had
no time to save even their handbags. In another case the pilot
became conscious of fire at 3,000 feet. It smelled like insulation,
so he turned off the generator and the master switch that led from
the battery to all electrical apparatus. As he was losing altitude, a
passenger remarked that the rear of the cushion seemed to be
getting hot. On removing the cushion, he found a small part of the
upholstery smoldering. This was put out. When the passengers
raised the lid under the seat cushion which gave access to the radio
receiver and battery, large flames leaped in their faces. The flames
were so big that the pilot decided not to use the extinguisher, fearing
a combination of flame and extinguisher fumes would knock him
out. The passengers closed the door, replaced the seat cushions to
their usual position and sat down on them to keep the fire within
the radio compartment. The pilot landed lafely saving his passen-
gers, but the ship was destroyed.
Several years ago the National Fire Protection Association
studied the situation and came to the conclusion that 12% of all
airplane losses were caused by hangar fires. Their analysis of 40
fires was as follows:
Number of Fires
Ignition of Inflammable Vapors 13
Explosion, source unknown 4
Doping operations 2
Fire in engines 2
Oil burner 1
Washing plane with gasoline I
Flames from exhaust of engine 1
Explosion of gas heater I




Overheated furnace or stove 4
Coal stove tipped over I
Smoking 4
Welding Operations 3
Welding gasoline tank 1
Acetylene torch set fire to fabric of plane
Fire in gasoline torch
Miscellaneous 51
Acetylene torch ignited barrel of lacquer 1
Supposed short circuit 2
Lightning I




Fire losses could be reduced if airplane owners, airport man-
agers and ground personnel could be taught to respect the fire
hazards that continually surround the airplane. Ignorance or lack
of discipline among ground personnel is the most frequent cause of
fire loss. Good hangar housekeeping should prevent fires from
starting by proper installation and maintenance of electrical and
heating equipment, by permitting no open flame within the hangar
proper (limiting. welding if necessary to locations near the door),
by absence of flammable debris in the hangar, by exercise of self-
control and discipline on the part of personnel in regard to smoking,
welding, testing, doping, cleaning airplanes with gasoline and operat-
ing engines inside the hangar. To attack fires and keep them from
spreading after they start, a supply of adequate fire extinguishers
should be quickly accessible. It is of great importance to attack
the fire when it is still very small because the usual extinguisher is
not large enough to cope with larger fires, hence the great need for
speed. Personnel should be instructed in the proper use of the
various types of extinguishers (see First Aid Fire Appliances, Pub-
lished by National Board of Fire Underwriters).
Crowded hangars always present a concentration of fire hazard.
While it would be desirable not to have wings overlap and in fact
to have each airplane separately stored in its own fire-proof hangar,
the economics of hangar operation militate against such practice.
Nevertheless, by good hangar construction and strict management,
losses could be reduced appreciably. (See Construction and Pro-
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tection of Airplane Hangars, National Board of Fire Underwriters.)
A good airport manager should periodically check his hangar
as follows:
Airport Self-Inspection Report - Fire
(The airport management should appoint a fire inspector to check "Fire"
hazards with this report.)
Take nothing for granted-See the object before you comment on it.
Make someone responsible to adjust, repair, clean or admonish whenever
required-the responsible person's name should be noted and he should be
followed up. Make your comments and instructions specific.
LOCATION
GENERAL APPEARANCE
Crowding of equipment; ease of
rolling equipment out; any equipment
such as cars, that should not be in
hangar. Look under staircases, in
booths.
FLOOR AND WALLS
Especially corners; no oil, no papers,
no debris; cleaned nightly.
Roof trusses.
Floors should be kept clear of ac-
cumulated grease or oil.
DOORS





Men should be instructed in operation
of extinguishers. Hold drills every
month.
STORAGE ROOM
Clean. Condition of electrical equip-
ment and conduits. Flares, paint,
dope. Door should be spring closing.
LOCKERS AND CABINETS





Conduits (Plugs should be 40" above
floor).
Extension cords-insulation.




Overheating sparks, insulation, leaks.
Heating system should be in separate
vapor tight room. If by coal stove,
should be about 18" above, floor.
DIRECT FIRE HAZARDS
Anyone smoking (who).
Anyone running engines (who).
Anyone welding (who) (extinguish-
ers on Welding stand). Extra man
standing by with extinguisher.
Anyone soldering (who).
Anyone doping or spraying (who).
Anyone cleaning ships with gas
(who).
Any tanks overflowing or leaking.
Adjoining fire hazards (dry grass,
piled debris, railroads, etc.).
OFFICE
Doors, fire extinguishers, floor, waste






Vapor proof bulbs, floors, walls,
cleaned nightly, waste cans, benches,
smoking, extension cords, lamps (see
electrical equipment).
DOPE Room
Vapor proof bulbs, condition.
Electrical wiring, condition (There
should be no plug outlets).
Switches (should be vapor proof).
Ventilation.









Shoes worn by workmen-sparks.
RUBBISH CANS & SELF CLOSING CANS
(for oily rags, waste)
Lids on, cleaned out daily.
SIGNS AND BULLETIN BOARD
Condition.
NIGHT WATCH PUNCH LOCK SYSTEM
OUTSIDE EQUIPMENT
Gas pumps & Trucks-condition (no
refueling in hangar permitted).
Fire Extinguishers--condition.
Condition of hose.
Grounding wire and chain. (Tanks
should be grounded both while being
drained or filled.)
Fences, gates, roads.
Anyone smoking in vicinity during
operations.








Fire extinguishers should bear tags
showing last recharge date, should be
recharged at least once per year and
immediately after use. All extin-
guishers except carbon dioxide and
carbon tetrachloride types must be
protected from freezing. Hangar
should be .supplied with one 2/%A gal-
lon Foam extinguisher for each 2500
square feet of fire area or one 15 lb.
carbon dioxide extinguisher plus one
one-quart carbon tetrachloride extin-
guisher, a forty gallon Foam wheeled
extinguisher for each 7500 square
feet of fire area. Offices and waiting
rooms should have a Foam or Soda
Acid extinguisher for each 2500
square feet of area or less. Repair
shops, storage rooms, engine testing
rooms should be equipped with one
2V2 gallon Foam extinguisher and a
15 pound carbon dioxide extinguisher,
one one-quart carbon tetrachloride
extinguisher for each 2500 square
feet of area or less. Welding stands
should be supplied with a one-quart
carbon tetrachloride extinguisher.
Filling stations or trucks should have
several of these or carbon dioxide
extinguishers.
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Inspector .................................... D ate ........................
Keep this report on file, check fire hazards at least once per month and
keep your eyes open in between.
Good practice for refueling and starting engines would be
along the following lines:
(a) No smoking within fifty feet of the aircraft being re-
fueled. 'No Smoking' signs should be displayed in prominent places.
(b) The engine should be stopped, switches in an 'off' posi-.
tion, and the engine cooled.
(c) The power on all radio transmitters and receivers should
be off.
(d) The refueling equipment and the aircraft must be
grounded.
'(e) Gasoline should not be permitted to overflow from the
tank. In hot weather, tanks should not be completely filled with
cold gasoline which will subsequently expand and overflow. Even
the spark from a steel tool dropping on concrete can set off gasoline
fumes.
(f) Only those responsible for the refueling or the mainte-
nance of aircraft should be allowed within fifty feet of the refueling
operation.
(g) No aircraft should be refueled in hangars.
(h) A good felt strainer is preferable to a chamois.
(i) No refueling during Winter flying operations while the
engine is being warmed by application of heat from plumber's stove
or similar means.
(j) Fire extinguishers should be within easy reach of those
refueling.
(k) When starting the engine, special care shouid be taken
not to overprime, and if the aircraft is not fitted with a pressure
type of fire extinguisher, it is a wise precaution to have a man
present outside the aircraft with a portable fire extinguisher.
(1) In the event of a backfire, endeavor to keep the engine
turning over so as to suck the flames up into the air intake.
(in) Do not start engines with pools of gasoline under the
airplanes.
Fires in the air or in the carburetor can be fought as follows:
(a) Turn off gasoline.
(b) Open throttle fully.
(c) Switch off, after engine has ceased firing.
(d) Lose height by side slipping.
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Students should be given practice in this routine until they
carry it out without hesitation.
(a), (b) and (c) should also be used in the event of an engine
catching fire on the ground.
The throttle is opened fully to use up as quickly as possible
the gasoline in the carburetor.
Sideslipping is to prevent the smoke from entering the cockpit
and the flames from spreading down the fuselage.
From the design engineer's point of view it seems that non-
flammable fabric both in the upholstery and exterior covering would
prevent many fires. Fuel lines that do not fracture or burn through
so easily would also help and apparently they will soon be common
practice in engine installation. Flame arrestors on carburetors
would prevent many fires, especially in winter when a combination
of over-priming and backfires results in many losses (ships should
be turned tail to wind, so that flames will not lick backwards along
fuselage). A code of good practice for the installation of all elec-
trical equipment is very much needed. The design of cabins and
seats so that sparks could not lodge in covers or fall under the
floor onto fabric would also help.
The smaller need for welding and doping on riveted metal air-
planes would reduce fire losses if the number of such ships in pro-
portion to the total were greater.
Fires which occur after a forced landing or a crash might be
reduced if heavy oil were used instead of gasoline. The retractable
undercarriage and perhaps the tricycle undercarriage should have
a favorable effect on reducing fires following a forced landing
because the airplane is less likely to turn over on its back. If the
stall/spin could be avoided in landing accidents, many gruesome
fires following crashes might be avoided.
The problems affecting fire hazards are well known and recog-
nized by engineers. Progress is being made towards their solution.
But fire losses due to hazards that exist now can be reduced only
by educating airplane operators and mechanics to the need for good
housekeeping as well as the adoption of safe practices in operating
and working around the airplanes.
According to the Bureau of Air Commerce records, non-sched-
uled flying is becoming safer. In the periods 1932 to 1937, the
mileage flown by airplanes in non-scheduled operation increased
about 32% while the miles flown per accident increased 50%. This
is a good indication of the increasing reliability and safety of air
travel achieved by design, regulation and education.
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If accidents involving student instruction could be separated
from these accident statistics, the record would probably be much
better. However, approximately 20% (1 in 5) of all certificated
airplanes were involved in an accident last year, and of that number
97% needed replacement of a major assembly, required complete
overhaul or were completely demolished. Furthermore, with less
than Y3 of the total number of all certificated airplanes insured, the
insurance companies pay out an average of well over $1,000 per day
in aviation claims exclusive of airline claims. Although the general
accident trend is improving, a study of ways and means of reducing
accidents should show where important advances can be made.
It is estimated that at the end of 1937 there were about 2,000
light planes in this country. A light plane, as commonly understood
ii this country, is one. which weighs under 1,500 pounds with a
wing loading in the neighborhood of 6-10 pounds per square foot
and a power loading of 19-26 pounds per horsepower. In the same
year there occurred 592 accidents among these planes or an acci-
dent rate of 30% compared with 20% for all civil airplanes. This
does not include airplanes lost by hangar fire because records are
not available of all such losses. In the typical light plane accident,
the airplane is severely damaged but not washed out; the injury to
personnel is nil; the accident occurs while landing or taking off and
it is caused by pilot error.
An analysis of these accidents shows that the nature of the
accidents varies considerably with the make of the airplane. One
make of airplane had a high percentage of take off accidents and a
high percentage of pilot errors with a low percentage of engine
failures. This airplane had a higher wing loading than others.
Since the type of flying was the same for all, it is surmised that
many of the accidents may have been due to pilots underestimating
the speed and distance necessary for take off.
Another make suffered a comparatively high percentage of
structural failures. This is rare and when it does occur it is not
likely to be dangerous to personnel. It is likely, however, to cause
considerable damage to the airplane.
A third make had an average showing with regard to damage
to the aircraft but its personnel injury record was better than the
others. A-low percentage of pilot errors indicated good flying char-
acteristics but a high percentage of forced landings might indicate
that it was used a good deal for cross country work because many
forced landings are due to fuel shortage or getting lost.
An analysis of accidents by class of flying shows a high per-
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centage of accidents due to pilot error for instructional flying, a low
percentage for commercial flying. See table 1. This emphasizes the
need for competent instruction and close supervision of flight train-
ing. The fact that there are more accidents in instructional flying
than in pleasure or commercial flying may be counterbalanced by the
excess of instructional flying over other flying. Such an excess is
indicated by the ratio of student permits to certificated pilots. The
ratio is about 40,000 (possibly 20,000 active) to 18,000.
The classification of light plane accidents by class of pilots
shows that 52% of the accidents involved student pilots. This was
to be expected. See table 2.
Although Limited-Commercial Pilots number about 3% of the
total certificated pilots in the country, they accounted for 6% of
the light plane accidents and 30% of these were fatal. The severity
of the accidents involving Limited-Commercial Pilots is possibly
due to the limited experience and undue confidence. It is generally
felt -that over 50 and under 500 hours the average pilot's confidence
exceeds his ability. The majority of Limited-Commercial Pilots fall
in this class. Before that time they are certain that they do not
know it all and after that time they again suspect limits to their
ability. This reasoning would also apply to Private Pilots, but the
record of the Private Pilot is improved by the caution of Private
Pilots having over 500 hours. After 200 hours a Limited-Com-
mercial Pilot will usually become a Commercial or revert to Private.
It is not advisable to discriminate against Limited Commercial
Pilots as such but rather it is advisable to look with suspicion on a
pilot with less than 200 hours flying unless much of it has been cross-
country and a checkup reveals that his judgment and attitude to-
wards safety are satisfactory.
Mr. James E. Hoskins, Chairman of the Aviation Committee
of the Actuarial Society of America, in an address on Aviation Life
Insurance to the National Association of State Aviation Officials in
1936, made the following comments on pilot mortality. These com-
ments should not be confused with airplane accidents because less
than 10% of aircraft accidents result in pilot fatalities.
"It appears that the most dangerous time in a pilot's career is
not while he is taking instruction or in the early part of his solo
flying, but for a period after he receives an advance license or mili-
tary rating. At first he knows he is green and plays safe; eventually
he gains skill; but there is an intermediate time when his self-
confidence exceeds his ability.
"Pilots who have been involved in an accident in recent years
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or have been disciplined for a serious violation of air regulations
have a greater chance of a fatal crash than those who have not,
although they might be expected to have become especially careful.
"No great difference has been observed between the younger
pilots and those of more mature years. Perhaps this might be true
but for the care exercised in licensing pilots." Note: This refers
to mortality rate; young pilots have more accidents, however.
"The kind of flying is very important. Those kinds which are
most closely supervised, either by yourselves and Uncle Sam, or
by responsible owners, are clearly the safest, such as airline and
military flying, and airplanes owned by corporations for business
use. In the case of airline pilots, however, this is offset by their
large number of annual hours in the air.
"The average amount of flying in the course of a year is by
far the most important factor affecting the insurance company's
problem of chai'ging for a year's insurance."
Insofar as insurance rating is concerned, classification by type
of license is not sufficient. A Commercial Pilot of long experience
should be safer to fly with than a Private Pilot with a couple of
hundred hours but if the former flies a thousand hours to the
Private Pilot's fifty per year, he is a worse risk from the insurance
companies' viewpoint. For that reason, Commercial Pilots usually
pay a higher rate than Private Pilots. The exposure to hazard is
greater.
In an old but interesting report the Actuarial Society of
America have the following to say in 1932:
"There are indications that the mortality among students is
relatively low, but that after obtaining a license, and particularly
after qualifying for a Transport License, the pilot is liable to reach
a stage where, in the words of a Navy Department report, 'The
flash of over-confidence seems to carry the novice beyond the realm
of his ability.'
"It appears that the mortality rate increases with amount of
annual flying time, although not in direct proportion.
"Most of the available evidence indicates no material improve-
ment in annual mortality rate after 500, or at the most 1;000 hours'
experience has been passed. Evidence indicates that the annual
mortality rate of pilots of long experience is not materially better
than that of pilots having from 500 to 1,000 hours' experience.
"Furthermore, it appears that the proportion of pilots with
records of accidents since 1927 is higher among young pilots than
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among older pilots. That is to say, young pilots are more than
usually liable to have accidents; and, having had accidents, have a
high rate of mortality. The conclusion seems to be that applications
from young pilots should be underwritten with especial care, to
ascertain that they have neither an accident record nor character-
istics which are liable to produce accidents."
These statistics and conclusions may be changed in the next
two or three years by the new regulations which provide for the
special approval of instructors, and by the attitude of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority towards instructional flying.
The safest type of flying appears to be commercial with pleasure
slightly 'better than instruction. The safest class of pilot is the
Commercial, followed by the Private and Student. A student under
good supervision should be safer than one under poor supervision.
It would be useful and interesting to verify this, if it were possible.
Limited commercial pilots have a worse record than students.
From the classification of accidents by nature, the deadliness
of spins and stalls with or without engine power is outstanding.
This contributed 46%o of the light planes that were totally destroyed
and 63%o of the fatalities. See table 3.
It seems that the most outstanding need among light planes, and
heavier airplanes too, is to design one that will not spin or whip into
a dive after stalling or perhaps not stall at all. If such an airplane
were used extensively, the accident rate would probably continue
to be the same because of the human desire to push a machine to
its utmost, but the severity of the accidents would be lessened.
It is interesting to note that a collision with another aircraft
in flight is not necessarily fatal. 'Only-three such accidents were
recorded with light planes last year.
Collision in full flight with objects other than aircraft are
usually fatal. Ninety-two per cent of these accidents were due to
pilot error.
The fact that take-off accidents are more severe than landing
accidents although not as frequent may reflect the fact that there is
greater emphasis on landing technique than on take-off technique.
Perhaps the tricycle undercarriage will simplify both techniques.
Engine failure as a cause of accidents is higher than any other
cause except pilot error. The fact that there is a comparatively high
proportion of severe accidents and aircraft damaged compared to
severe personal injury leads to the conclusion that a pilot with a
dead engine usually can put the airplane down with safety to him-
self if not to the airplane. See table 4.
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A study of the tables reveals:
Nature of Accident by Frequency
(From Table 1)
Landing ............ ...... .32%
Take off ...................... 22%
Spin/stall engine OK ............. 11%
Forced landing ................... 10%
Taxiing .......................... 10%
% Completely % Resulting in
Most Damaging (From Table 3) Demolished Fatal Injury
Spin/stall engine failure ................. 75% 50%
Spin/stall engine OK .................... 57% 43%
Collision with non-aircraft ............... 52% 40%
Structural failure ...................... 37% 25%
Collision with aircraft .................. 33% 33%
Many other interesting conclusions may be obtained from these
tables but they indicate that pilot error is the most important cause
of accidents with design and characteristics of the aircraft con-
tributing largely. The frequency of landing, take off and spin/stall
accidents is consistent with records of accidents involving heavier
airplanes. Most engineers are well aware of this regrettable con-
dition.
Because proper instruction is the best guarantee of loss pre-
vention among student pilots, one group of insurance companies has
itself undertaken the task of approving instructor pilots. A student
pilot flying under the supervision of an approved instructor pilot
is eligible to secure very inexpensive personal accident insurance.
Seventy per cent of the applicants for approval as instructors have
been approved.
Reasons for deferring the approval of an applicant are various.
For example, a man who derives a major part of his'income from
an activity outside of aviation is seldom approved as an instructor.
Applications have been made by policemen, postmen, factory work-
ers, and other pilots who instruct only in their spare time. Unless
the latter have outstanding records, their applications are deferred
for three reasons:
1. Since these men are away from the field a good portion
of the time, they do not know how the equipment in which they
instruct is being used. The airplane may receive a very severe
beating and get into a dangerous structural condition, yet these men
might not know about it because of their absence from the field.
2. Since they have only a limited time in which to give in-
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struction they are likely to hurry through their instruction and also
are likely to take chances by instructing in bad weather.
3. The fact that they have another source of income might
tend to make them less careful about the condition of their equip-
ment and their flying operations in general.
Incidentally, the size and nature of the airport from which
instruction is carried on is also considered in the approval of in-
structors. One pilot, who flies from a field which is considered too
small, presents the argument that his students are better pilots
because they learn to land in a small field. He adds that pilots who
have learned to fly from larger fields find difficulty in getting into
his small field although his students do it very easily. The reply to
this argument was as follows:
"In general Student Pilots who learn to fly from small fields
know how to handle themselves better when making forced landings
than those who learn to fly from large. fields. It has also been said
that pilots who learn to fly in dangerous airplanes are better pilots
than, those who learn to fly in safe airplanes because they are prac-
ticed in the art of handling themselves under uncertain conditions.
Pilots who learned to fly during the war are usually cited as
examples.
"If this reasoning were applied to other activities, a person
learning to drive a car for instance should not learn on a lonely
road but rather should be taught at the corner of 42nd Street and
Broadway! This policy would indicate that one should learn and
practice under the most difficult'and severe conditions in order to
be safe under normal. conditions. A good deal of merit exists in
this reasoning except that it might prove expensive and it inhibits
progress. The fact, so far as commercial aviation is concerned, is
that successful instruction in the early days, when dangerous air-
planes were used, was given only to 'supermen,' who had more
'guts' than the average, and therefore reacted better in, emergencies.
The others, who did not react safely, were killed. In these days,
however, we are dealing with the average person in commercial
aviation. It appears that the correct and safe procedure is to learn
in the normal way at a normal field and to prepare for the difficult
situations during the course of instruction."
The requirements for instructor approval by the insurance or-
ganization are not very stiff. They are designed to be minimum
rather than maximum. The object is to shut out the instructor who
is unqualified rather than reward outstanding merit. The require-
ments are:
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1. A Commercial Pilot Certificate with an Instructor's Rating
and at least 400 hours solo. This amount of time is required as it is
felt that only after at least such an amount will the pilot have had
sufficient general experience.
2. A few students licensed to indicate success and ability to
impart knowledge and a demonstrated thoroughness and competence
in instruction.
3. The planes used will be of suitable design with suitable
engines and well maintained.
4. His general record will be reasonably good, i. e., no excess
drinking, few or no accidents, good reputation, no recklessness.
Concerning accidents, one or two are not grounds for deferring
approval provided they were largely due to circumstances beyond
the pilot's control.
5. Full time employment as an instructor. This restriction
was put in to eliminate unfair competition to those who depended
solely on instruction for a livelihood as well as to eliminate cSsual
instructors. Exceptions are occasionally made, as for instance in
the case of pilots who have a flying job which leaves them enough
time for instruction.
Seventy per cent of the applicants have been approved, 30%
have been deferred. Those deferred fall into the following classes.
In some cases there were two or more reasons for deferring action.
Airport Unsatisfactory ................................... 9 5%
Not a full time Instructor ................................ 47 24%
Character, i. e., reckless, excess drinking, too impulsive, etc. 25 13%
Equipment obsolete or poorly maintained .................. 7 4%
Flying unsatisfactory, i. e., incompetent instructor, lack ex-
perience, too many accidents, poor supervision ......... 55 28%
Miscellaneous ............ ......................... 16 8%
Under 400 hours ......................................... 35 18%
194 100%
Among those deferred, examples of improper instruction were
frequent. One instructor would not give spins to a student until
just before the license test was due for fear of scaring the student.
Civil Aeronautics Authority regulations require spin instruction
before solo. Another pilot was giving spin instruction and was
looking back at the student while so doing. He suddenly saw a
tree go by, realizing the scarcity of trees at high altitudes above the
ground, the instructor got to work and pulled the plane out in time
to prevent a fatality. However, he hit so forcibly in the recovery
that one side of the landing gear was washed out. Other pilots were
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turned down for such physical defects as color blindness, fainting
spells, etc. Lack of supervision or incompetent supervision was
considered a serious flaw. In one case a student was permitted to
snap-roll, loop and spin at 400 feet.
At this point, it should be advisable to emphasize that the typical
professional pilot is a very sober, earnest individual, sincere in his
desire to see aviation advance and very cooperative in his attitude
towards safety. He is very far from the slap-dash type which
popular imagination finds so romantic.
Besides insisting on minimum qualifications for an 'instructor
pilot, it has been found necessary to outline desirable courses of
instruction. These are merely recommended. Instruction procedure
is not so important as thoroughness and constant supervision by a
well qualified instructor. For example, in the outline which follows,
taxiing instruction is given as one of the first of the courses. But
one very successful instructor gives this last because he thinks taxi-
ing is more difficult than learning to fly. The outline has been found
satisfactory. It has been adopted by several flying schools and
represents current good practice in flying instruction.
Recommended Outline of Instruction Toward a Private
Pilot's Certificate
1. First Phase: Minimum training of eight flight hours.
(a) PREIMINARY GROUND INSTRUCTION: Thorough familiarization with
functioning of airplane, controls, engine, and instruments. Warning
about: danger from propellers; difference between ground and air
speed; leaving engine running with no one in cockpit; parking ship
in strong winds; st.rting engine, switching, choking, priming, signals
(student not to handle propeller). Advice against mixing liquor and
flying. It is good policy to discuss the ensuing lesson with the student
on the ground before taking-off.
(b) Taxiing to proficiency (handling of ship in gusty air).
(c) Air Work.
(1) Straight and level flight to proficiency.
(2) Gentle climbs and glides to proficiency.
(3) Gentle turns.
(4) Approaches for landing.
(5) Stalls, stressing approaches to stalls and recovery.
(6) A: Landings and take-offs.
B: Simulated forced landings from take-offs only from ap-
proximately 200 feet.
(7) Spins and recovery.
(8) Solo.
2. Second Phase: Minimum twelve hours. A check by the instructor be-
fore each of the first three solo flights and frequent checks at least ONCE
EvERY THREE HOURS through all maneuvers required in the first phase.
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This is to prevent student from feeling now that he had soloed, he can
have ship any old time; also to compensate for changes in air conditions.
Instruction in:
(a) Figure 8's, gentle and steep.
(b) Simulated forced landings.
(c) Dual cross country trips with landings at other airports and a thor-
ough check and review of all maneuvers of the first two phases.
3. Third Phase: Instructor's check of all maneuvers in phases one and two
ONCE EvFRv FIVE HouRs, stressing the following:
(a) Precision maneuvers (spot landings, simulated forced landings, spins
and figure 8's).
(b) Solo cross country.
(c) Complete Private Pilot's examination.
NOTE: The above is a logical and normal sequence of instruction to serve
as a GuIDE to instructors, and to give a UNIFORMITY OF INSTRUCrToN in a
sequence that experience has shown to be one that insures the greatest prog-
ress by the student. Records of the student's progress should be kept.
It is further recommended that students be acquainted with control tower
operation and flight plan procedure.
All the comments made thus far result principally from the
existing characteristics of the airplane (design) and of existing
control or regulation. These two agencies for increasing safety
cannot be quickly improved. Too much physical and mental inertia
would have to be overcome. The most logical and the easiest way
for improving the safety record and preventing losses is by educa-
tion and by disseminating the 'results of experience.
While generalizations are always dangerous, I should like to
venture the thought, with my fingers crossed, that safety is achieved
more readily by knowing how to operate safely that which we al-
ready have than by improvement in design. Human nature is so
constituted that improvements in design are employed not to achieve
safety but to take advantage of the greater utility which such im-
provements usually afford. A pilot may obtain an airplane with
which it is possible to get in and out of a very small airport. Instead
of considering this an emergency operation, he takes advantage of
the design to actually operate regularly from such airports. This
is a foible of human nature and is very much to be commended for
its effect on design but its effect on accidents is not favorable,
except indirectly.
Improvements in design usually make flying easier or make it
more useful, thus inducing more people to fly. The mileage flown
per accident seems to increase with greater use; hence the indirect
influence of improvements on safety records.. However, on the
basis of number of airplanes per accident, the future seems pessi-
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mistic. It must be admitted that the human element creates a
greater hazard than the airplane itself.
An agency for the education of instructors would aid tremen-
dously in promoting good instruction practice, in educating instruc-
tors in the finer points of the art, tipping them off on the best way
to instruct in various types of ships, and informing them where
instruction usually fails as indicated by accidents among students.
One type of ship is probably as good as another, so long as the
instructor understands the limitations of the ship and imparts this
knowledge to the student. For example, in a side by side ship with
wheel control, many students get in the habit of resting their hands
on the wheel, putting both hands on the wheel as though they were
driving a car. Then when an emergency arises, when one hand
should be on the throttle and one on the wheel, time is lost where
time is most valuable. Instructors who are training in this type
of ship should be advised of the situation and impart this knowledge
to their students. Under the present hit-and-miss system of in-
struction, the student is only advised by chance or if he happens
to get a really experienced instructor. The dangers of having the
center of gravity too far back are not emphasized enough. An-
other point is the technique in coming out of a spin. The usual
instructions are, "Kick opposite rudder and push the stick forward."
One instructor of long experience knowing that many recent acci-
dents were due to the failure to recover from spins, decided to see
what would happen if he obeyed the usual instructions, "Kick op-
posite rudder and push the stick ahead."
He made his tests in a popular type of airplane widely used
for instruction purposes. The engine was throttled slowly while
the airplane was held in normal flight attitude till complete stall
had occurred. At that time the elevator control was pulled straight
back and full right rudder applied. After completion of two full
turns of the resulting spin, the elevator control was pushed full
forward and hard left rudder applied. Instead of coming out of
the spin, the ship vibrated slightly, went over On its back and kept
spinning in an inverted position. Operation of rudder to either
side had little or no effect and the pilot was thrown violently against
the belt. Recovery was effected by pulling the wheel back, applying
right rudder until the spin became normal, after which the left
rudder was applied with the wheel moved to a position 4 back
from neutral.
The violent motion and the inverted position proved very con-
fusing to this pilot and in the case of a student being placed in the
same position might easily result in complete loss of head and spin-
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n ing in, and probably has. At the end of twelve tests, this instructor
concluded that recovery from a spin cannot necessarily be obtained
by shoving the wheel or stick forward in every case. Recovery is
effected slowly with resultant loss of altitude when the controls are
neutralized. Furthermore, instructors should abandon the stick-
full-forward explanation of recovery from spins unless it applies to
a particular ship. They should instil in their students the idea that
each ship may have slightly different characteristics.
These instances are merely mentioned to bring out the need
for improving and disseminating the finer phases of instruction
which are usually available only from very experienced instructors.
These finer points often mean the difference between safety and a
crash.
It is unlikley that the popular airplane of the future or, for
that matter, of today will receive adequate maintenance unless the
owners and pilots have the proper respect for and knowledge of
maintenance. Thorough inspections at long intervals must be sup-
plemented by continuous preventive maintenance. Airline experi-
ence has proved it, regulations require it but only education, can
show the need and desirability for it. Regulation cannot succeed
without the owners' and pilots' cooperation, and that can be secured
through, education.
To show the need for education in maintenance and inspection,
the following items are taken at random from typical inspection
reports on various light planes made between the yearly government
inspections. They show the need for training of owners and pilots
in maintenance or inspection. Each item is from a different ship:
(a) Left exhaust manifold flanges cracked; (b) Oil drain and
gasoline strainer not saftied; (c) Fiber bushings missing from the
elevator cables and from both rudder cables at the guide at the tail
of the fuselage; (d) Hinges on the right side of the elevator to
stabilizer evidently do not coincide causing considerable stiffness in
controls and bending the tip end of the stabilizer when moved;
(e) Oil drain pipe to tank twisted from removing the drain plug.
Metal tipping on propeller dented and cracked; (f)) Trailing edge
of wings in bad condition. Entering edge badly dented in several
places. Several ribs loose at trailing edge. Aircraft not grounded
while refueling. Smoking in vicinity of fuel pumps; (g) Baffle
for exhaust manifold loose. Oil tank loose. Brake. cables frayed
at wheels. Right front gas line loose. (h) Propeller hub bolt very
loose; (i) Left aileron hinges near fuselage loose on spar; (j)'
Engine exhaust manifold where connected to cabin heater cracked
and deteriorating. Stabilizer control worn and dirty. Fuel and
LOSS PREVENTION
oil lines too dirty to inspect; (k) Large wet type battery installed
at left side of pilot's seat for night flying. No battery box, no drain
nor any special provision for installation.
An instructor should instil in his students a proper respect, not
fear, for the existing characteristics of airplanes. He should en-
courage his students to fly within present day operating limitations
and impart the knowledge required to judge the airworthiness of
an airplane. Such instructors are hard to find except in the large
schools and at old and well operated airports. Many instructors
think they are doing the right thing when they have been improperly
trained themselves. The training of good instructors will do more
than any other act to increase safety and prevent losses.
In conclusion the need exists for an agency, probably Federal,
which would undertake the education of new flying instructors,
teaching them the best methods for imparting flying technique.
This would have a more favorable effect on the accident rate and
especially on the severity of accidents than any other movement
in Aviation. While accident prevention is of tremendous importance
to aviation, insufficient recognition has been given to losses caused
by fire and windstorm, which are outside the common definition or
conception of an airplane accident. These losses may not involve
the safety of life but they do seriously affect the economics of avia-
tion. Ground personnel and -aircraft operators should be instructed
to respect and adopt precautions against fire, windstorm and other
hazards pending improvements in airplane design which will re-
duce them.
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Table I




Inst. Comm. Pleas. Tot
Washout .......... A 53 5 39 97
Major Overhaul .... B 135 27 102 264
Major Repair ...... C 117 16 93 226
Minor Repair ....... D 4 - 1 5
Total ........... 309 48 235 592
52% 8% 40%
Injury to Personnel
Fatal ............. A 30 2 19 51
Severe ............. B 17 3 16 36
Minor ............. C 16 4 29 49
None .............. D232 32 154 418
Total ............ 295 41 218 554
Nature of Accident
Collision, full flight,
with aircraft .... A 3 - - 3
Collision, full flight,
with non-aircraft..B 13 3 9 25
Spin/stall eng. fail..C .5 - 3 8
Spin/stall eng. OK.D 37 7 22 66
Forced Landing .... E 28 4 27 59
Landing Accident . .F 112 12 65 189
Takeoff Accident .. G 57 9 64 130
Taxiing Accident .. H 34 4 19 57
Fire in Air ......... I - - I I
Structural Failure. .N 4 2 2 8
Miscellaneous ...... X 2 - 3 5
Indeterminate ...... Y - - 3 3
Not responsible. .*NR 14 7 17 38
Total ............ 309 48 235 592
Cause of Accident
Pilot ................ 213 17 129 359
Structural Failure ..... 10 3 I1 24
Weather ............ 33 10 25 68
Airport ............... 7 1 14 22
Miscellaneous ........ 12 6 18 36
Engine Failure ........ 38 9 34 81
Unknown ............ 1 - 4 5
Not responsible ...... 14 7 17 38
Total .............. 328 53 252 633
Per Cent
Inst. Comm. Pleas. Tot
17 10 17 16 A
44 56 43 45 B
38 34 40 38C
1 - + ID
100 100 100 100
10 5 9 9A
6 7' 7 6B
5 10 13 9 C
79 78 71 76 D
100 100 100 100
1 - - 1A
4 6 4 4B
2 - I IC
12 15 9 11D
9 8 12 10 E
36 25 28 32 F
18 19 27 22 G
11 8 8 10H
- - + +I
1 4 1 I'N
1 - 1 IX
- - 1 IY
5 15 8 6NR
100 100 100 100
65 32 51 57
3 6 4 4
10 19 10 11
2 2 6 3
4 11 7 5
12 17 14 13
+ - 1 1
4 13 7 6
100 100 100 100
* Planes Involved in a collision but in no way responsible. The planes may
be at rest, taking off, landing, or taxiing.
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Table 2





Completely Demolished A 16 10 19
Major Overhaul ...... B 49 11 68
Major Repair ........ C 32 12 49









Total .............. 97 33 136 288 -554












A 8 4 11 28 51
B 9 4 11 12 36
C 11 6 14 18 49
D 69 19 100 230 418
97 33 136 288 554
Per Cent I
Pri Stu Tot
14 17 17 A
50 43 45 B
36 39 37 C
- 1 1D
100 100 100
8 10 9 A
8 4 6B
10 6 9 C




with aircraft ....... A - -
Collision, full flight,
with non-aircraft ... B 9 2
Spin/stall eng. fail .... C 2 1
Spin/stall engine OK..D 8 5
Forced Landing ...... E 10 4
Landing Accident ..... F 32 7
Take-off Accident .... G 24 11
Taxiing Accident ..... H 7 2
Fire in Air ......... I - -
Structural Failure .... N 4 1
Miscellaneous ........ X I -
Indeterminate ........ Y - -
1 2 3
Total .............. 97 33 136 288 554
Cause of Accident
Pilot ................... 42 22 83 212 359
Structural Failure ...... 10 2 4 8 24
Weather ............... 12 3 19 34 68
Airport ................ 8 2 7 5 22
Miscellaneous .......... 11 3 10 12 36
Engine °F7ilure ......... 20 6 23 32 81
Unknown ............- - 1 4 5
Total ................ 103 38 147 307 595
NOTE: Accidents classified under NR (light
the accident) were not considered in this table.













40 58 56 69 60
10 5 3 3 4
12 8 13 11 11
8 5 5 2 4
11 8 7 4 6
19 16 15 10 14
- - 1 1 1
100 100 100 100 100
airplane not responsible for
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Table 3




NATURE A B C D Tot A B C D Tot
Read Across
A 1 1 1 - 3 33 33 34 - 100
B 13 11 1 - 25 52 44 4 - 100
C 6 2 - - 8 75 25- - 100
D 38 23 3 2 66 57 35 5 3 100
E 7 30 22 - 59 12 51 37 - 100
F 12 87 90 - 189 6 46 48 - 100
G 12 76 42 - 130 9 59 32 - 100
H - 16 40 1 57 - 28 70 2 100
I 1--- 1 100 - 100
N 3 3 2 - 8 37 37 26 - 100
X - 3 2 - 5 - 60 40 - 100
Y - - 3 - 3 - - 00 - 100
NR 4, 12 20 2 38 11 32 52 5 100


















NATURE A B C D Tot
A 1 - 1 1 3
B 10 3 3 9 25
C 4-- 4 8
D 28 14 6 18 66
E - 2 12 45 59
F 5 8 11 165 189
G 1 8 13 108 130
H - - 1 56 57
I - - - 1 1
N 2- 1 5 8
X - 1 1 3 5
Y 3 3
Tot 51 36 49 418 554
ury to Personnel
PER CENT
A B C D Tot
33 - 33 34 100
40 12 12 36 100
50 - - 50 100
43 .21 9 27 100
- 3 20 77 100
3 4 6 87 100
1 6 10 83 100
- - 2 98 100
- - - 100 100
25 - 12 63 100
- 20 20 60 100
--- 00 100
9 6 9 76 100
PER CENT
A B C D
2 -- 2 +
19 8 6 2
8 1
55 39 12 4
- 6 25 11
10 22 22 40
2 22 27 26
- - 2 13
4 - 2 1
3 2 1
100 100 100 100
MEANING OF LETTERS
DAMAGE TO INJURY TO NATURE OF ACCIDENT
AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL A Collision, full flight, with aircraft
A Washout A Fatal B Collision, with flight, with non-aircraft
B Major Overhaul B Severe C Spin/stall eng. fall H Taxiing Accident
C Major Repair C Minor D Spin/stall engine OK I Fire in Air
D Minor Repair D None E Forced Landing N Structural Failure
F Landing Accident X Miscellaneous
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